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11 Introduction
When agents have private information about their preferences, there is generally no in-
centive compatible mechanism that implements the ex-ante socially eﬃcient solution.1 In
a recent paper Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) readdress this issue. They demonstrate
how the limitations that incentive constraints impose on the attainment of socially desirable
outcomes can be overcome when independent social decision problems are linked. They pro-
pose to “ration” or “budget” the agents’ representations in accordance with their empirical
distribution. Imposing those budgets increases eﬃciency of the outcomes as compared to
deciding on each problem separately since it allows to ask the players the question: “which
decision do you care more about?” Let us illustrate this point with an example.
Consider coalition talks between two political parties. In the course of the negotiations,
agreements on a variety of topics have to be reached. From a social point of view (assuming
that the parties reﬂect the preferences of their voters), for each single decision it would be
desirable if the party succeeded that cares more about the issue. Assume that it is publicly
known that each party is equally likely to care a lot, or a little about each single issue on
the table.2 If, however, only the parties themselves know their preferences exactly, they
have an incentive to pretend to assign high importance to every single issue in order to
aﬀect the result of the negotiations in their favor. A budget in the sense of Jackson and
Sonnenschein would restrict both sides to state a high importance for only half of the issues
that are negotiated. The parties then have an incentive to utilize their budget ﬁrst on issues
that are indeed important to them, until the budget is exhausted.
The example also demonstrates an obvious diﬃculty that arises upon implementation.
Institutions would be needed in order to implement and enforce a budget. While two
parties involved in coalition talks might ex–ante agree on procedures that eﬀectively result
in budgeting, in many situations, such institutions do not exist and are diﬃcult to establish.
Moreover, players do not only have an incentive to lie concerning their types, but concerning
their distribution of types: By claiming that they care a lot about almost everything that is
1See the well known contribution by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
2This is, of course, oversimpliﬁed but it facilitates to make our point.
2being decided they could achieve a more favorable budget, which complicates the ex–ante
agreement on institutions that enable budgeting.
However, in practice economic and political players are usually aware that they can
only exploit beneﬁts (i.e. eﬃciency gains) in a stable relationship if they do not upset
their counterpart by overweighing their own interest. Thus, social interaction could lead
to endogenous budgets that are enforced by the threat of retaliation. One of the problems
that come with the induced endogenous budget is that perception of compliance to such a
virtual budget need not be the same among the agents involved in the interaction, as we
will discuss below.
Following our above arguments that (i) a social planner who could enforce budgets is
not always available, but that (ii) budgets could also arise endogenously, in this paper we
compare the eﬀectiveness of exogenous budgets as proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein
with various forms of social interaction that have the potential to imply an endogenous
budget. In particular, we study stable partnerships, reputation building and competition for
partners. We do this in the context of an experiment where two players engage in a ﬁctitious
joint project. They always disagree on the version of the project to be implemented, but
the intensity of their preferences is private information. The agents decide on the version
to be implemented in a simple voting game where they have to indicate the intensity of
their preferences. The version which is preferred strongest is chosen (in case of a tie, a
coin ﬂip decides). We vary the matching protocol and whether subjects face an exogenous
budget on preference representation or not. We ﬁnd that exogenous budgets help players
to reap almost all achievable eﬃciency gains. Among the social interaction treatments,
only competition for partners leads to a signiﬁcant increase in truthful representation of
preferences and eﬃciency. Two control treatments serve to assess possible explanations
for the relatively low eﬀectiveness of social interaction. The ambiguity of signals does not
appear to be crucial. In contrast, the coordination problem in the sense that all involved
players should understand how to reap the eﬃciency gains and need to implicitly agree on
a budget, seems to be of major importance. Competition for partners enables players to
reduce this problem.
Our paper is related to three areas in recent literature. The paper by Jackson and
Sonnenschein was inspired and generalizes the storable votes idea of Casella (2005). Casella,
3Gelman and Palfrey (2006) study the storable votes mechanism experimentally and ﬁnd
that players make eﬀective use of the opportunity to store votes. Even though equilibrium
strategies are diﬃcult to compute, realized eﬃciency levels are very close to the theoretical
prediction. Hortala–Vallve (2004) generalizes the storable votes mechanism to “qualitative
voting”, which allows players to freely allocate votes across decisions. He also assumes that
they are informed about the intensity of their preferences concerning all decisions from the
start. Hortala–Vallve and Llorente–Saguer (2006) present experimental support. Subjects
generally vote in accordance with the equilibrium predictions if they vote over two issues.
If players vote over more than two issues, they deviate more frequently from the qualitative
voting equilibrium but still reach eﬃciency close to the equilibrium level. These results are
well in line with our result on the eﬀectiveness of the Jackson–Sonnenschein mechanism.
Kaplan and Ruﬄe (2005) study a market–entry game with private information. In contrast
to our results, they ﬁnd that players coordinate well on eﬃcient cut-oﬀ strategies. The
eﬀects of competition for partners in trust games is studied by Huck, L¨ unser, and Tyran
(2006). In line with our results, they ﬁnd that competition increases trustworthiness beyond
the level achieved through reputation building alone.3 A theoretical analysis of partner
choice in dilemma games is provided by Ule (2006).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the game we study, discuss
our main research questions in more detail, develop the experimental design, and introduce
some concepts we use to evaluate our data. Section 3 presents a theoretical analysis of
the diﬀerent settings and states our main hypotheses. In Section 4 we report the results.
Section 5 is devoted to the question which factors drive successful cooperation in the absence
of exogenous budgeting. Section 6 concludes.
2 An Experiment on Linking Decisions
In Section 2.1 we present a slightly modiﬁed version of one of Jackson and Sonnenschein’s
(2007) examples (in order to illustrate their point), and introduce two experimental treat-
3Coricelli, Fehr, and Fellner (2003) study partner selection in public good experiments. Interestingly,
the contribution levels are highest for unidirectional partner selection. Hauk and Nagel (2001) ﬁnd similar
results in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment.
4ments that shall evaluate the empirical relevance of the incentive problem and the eﬀec-
tiveness of the Jackson–Sonnenschein mechanism. Then, in Section 2.2, we argue that also
social interaction might solve the problem by implementing an endogenous budget. We il-
lustrate that players have an incentive to cooperate in order to realize (and share) eﬃciency
gains and propose three treatments that imply diﬀerent incentives to do so.
2.1 The Idea of Exogenous Budgets
Suppose that two players, a and b, are engaged in a joint project. It is common knowledge
that the players always disagree on the version of the project to be chosen. Let us call
the version preferred by player a version a, and the version preferred by player b version b.
Each player receives a positive payoﬀ only if his preferred version of the project is chosen.
A player’s intensity of preference for his preferred version, however, is private information.
The intensity can either be strong (s) or weak (w), where s > w. Both cases are equally
likely.4
Now suppose that a social planner wants to choose the version of the project that
maximizes the sum of the utilities. If the intensity of preferences is the same for both players,
the social planner is indiﬀerent which version to choose and can ﬂip a coin. Otherwise, he
wants to choose the version preferred by the player with the stronger intensity of preference.




player b’s preference w coin a
s b coin
Table 1: Eﬃcient social choice function
The problem with this social choice function is, however, that it is not incentive compat-
ible. That is, if it is applied to the players’ stated preferences, it is each player’s dominant
4The intensity of preferences corresponds to the payoﬀ received if the agent’s preferred version is chosen.
In the experiment we consider the case that s = 2w.
5strategy to always state a strong preference, whatever preference he observed. The closest
social choice function that can be implemented through an incentive compatible mechanism
is illustrated in Table 2.
player a states
w s
player b states w coin coin
s coin coin
Table 2: Incentive Compatible Mechanism
Note that under this social choice function the version is always determined by a ﬂip of a
coin, independently of the preferences stated by the two players.5 This social choice function
is ex–post Pareto eﬃcient, but not ex–ante. The reason is that once players have observed
their stated preferences it is not possible to write a contract that improves the situation of
both players. Ex–ante, however, this is possible. The linking mechanism exploits this fact.
Linking two independent decisions Now consider the case that the two players have to
decide on two independent problems simultaneously. First, note that if players separately
vote over the two problems, what was ex–ante Pareto ineﬃciency in the single decision
problem becomes ex–post ineﬃciency in the situation where players decide simultaneously
on two problems. To see this, consider the case that each player has one strong and one
weak preference and that player a’s preference is strong for the ﬁrst project whereas player
b’s preference is strong for the second one. Now, if for the ﬁrst project player b’s version
is chosen and for the second project player a’s, then, even ex–post, players would beneﬁt
from turning around the decision.
Jackson and Sonnenschein propose the following mechanism that links the two prob-
lems. When stating preference intensities for the two (independent) projects, each player is
5In case both players might prefer the same version with some positive probability, the mechanism would
be extended to simply voting on the version to be executed, without taking into account the intensities of
preferences and ﬂipping a coin whenever the agents disagree. In the experiment we only consider the case
where the players disagree.
6allowed to state a strong preference only once. The ex–ante eﬃcient social choice function
is then applied to the constrained announcements. Jackson and Sonnenschein show that
there is a Bayesian equilibrium of their mechanism with the following features:
• If an agent’s intensity of preference diﬀers across the two problems then he or she
announces truthfully.
• If an agent has two preference intensities of the same magnitude, then the agent
randomly chooses which problem to announce the strong preference for.
Although the equilibria of the linked mechanism are not Pareto eﬃcient (neither ex–ante
nor ex–post), the equilibrium outcomes still Pareto dominate from any perspective (ex–
ante, interim, or ex–post) voting on the problems separately. The reason is that linking
two problems allows to ask the players the question “Which decision do you care more
about?” Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) show that linking more decisions helps further,
and in the limit their mechanism leads to full Pareto eﬃciency.
As a ﬁrst step of our experimental study, we establish that the problem analyzed by
Jackson and Sonnenschein is indeed empirically relevant, i.e. experimental subjects follow
the incentives to overstate their preferences, and investigate whether it can be satisfactorily
solved by the mechanism they propose. For this purpose we run two treatments:
Treatment I: Random Matching (RAN) In this treatment, we test whether in an
environment without any incentive to be honest, honesty indeed breaks down. Subjects
are randomly rematched in pairs within a relatively large group (8 subjects) without any
opportunity for identiﬁcation and hence no opportunity to build a reputation for honesty
that could either be reciprocated or attract new partners. In each period, a pair of subjects is
engaged in one ﬁctitious project as described above. Intensities of preferences are randomly
drawn, independently among subjects and periods. After subjects are informed about the
intensity of their preference, they state a preference and then the version supported by the
stronger stated preference is implemented, i.e. this subject receives a payoﬀ while the other
receives nothing. The version is chosen randomly if the stated intensities are equal. At the
end of the period, each player is informed about both stated preferences, the version that
is implemented and his own resulting payoﬀs.
7Treatment II: Exogenous Budgets (EXO) In this treatment subjects were also re-
matched randomly, as in the previous treatment. However, each subject faced a budget
corresponding to the expected distribution of preferences, that is, he could state at most
20 strong preferences over the 40 periods that the experiment lasted.6
2.2 Can Budgets Arise Endogenously?
Diﬀerent forms of social interaction that allow for the formation of long–term partnerships
or reputation building may — to a diﬀerent extent — be capable of promoting cooperation
among players by endogenously creating a need to budget stated preferences. The second
aim of our study is to address this issue. We run several additional treatments to investigate
whether subjects manage to realize potential eﬃciency gains without exogenous budgeting
if (a) they interact repeatedly, (b) the environment oﬀers the chance to build a reputation,
or (c) they have to compete for partners.
Note that under incomplete information about preferences budgets are needed to estab-
lish cooperation, even if they are not enforced exogenously. Since a player cannot assess the
other’s honesty directly, any conditionally cooperative strategy can only be based on the
distribution of the other’s stated preferences. Hence, if one player follows a conditionally co-
operative strategy, this implies that the other player needs to budget his stated preferences,
independent of his real preferences.7 Obviously, it is required that decisions are sequential
for a player to be able to reciprocate violations of the endogenous budget,8 whereas an
exogenous budget can be applied to several decisions that are made simultaneously as well
6We did not limit the number of weak preferences that could be stated, as a rational player should
always exploit his budget for strong preferences completely. Indeed, almost all subjects did.
7A possible conditionally cooperative strategy that players might follow would be “stochastic tit–for–
tat”, i.e. switching to stating always strong preferences in the next m periods if the other player has stated
more than n < m strong preferences in the last m periods. Another possible, highly sophisticated strategy
would be “binomial trigger”, i.e. switching to always stating a strong preference once a binomial test applied
to the other player’s sequence of stated preferences allows one to reject the hypothesis that this sequence
is random at some pre–determined level.
8To be more precise, several decisions can be made simultaneously as long as these are repeated.
8as to those made sequentially. Another problem that arises with endogenous budgets is
that a player needs to know the other player’s strategy in order to know his own budget.9
We consider the following treatments.
Stable Partnerships (FIX) In this treatment, each pair stays together for the whole
course of the experiment. By comparing this to the random matching treatment (RAN),
we can assess to what degree subjects are able to realize the mutual gains from honesty in a
long–term relationship. Reciprocating honesty with honesty increases the expected payoﬀs
for both subjects (where honesty can only stochastically be detected via an endogenous
budget). In order to facilitate keeping track of past decisions, after each period players ob-
serve a summary of the history of the past periods played with their partner. In particular,
they observe announced preferences and the decisions that were taken within their pair in
all preceding periods.
Random Link Formation in Stable Groups: The Scope for Reputation Building
(RLK) In this treatment, subjects interact in ﬁxed groups of four, while partnerships
are still only formed by pairs. In each period, from each subject one link is established to
another, randomly selected subject in the group of four. Each of these links corresponds
to one project. Hence each subject can in any particular period be involved in one to four
projects which are independent in terms of valuations and implementation. That is, for
each of the projects in which a subject is involved, his or her valuation is independently
drawn. If there is a link from subject 1 to subject 2 and a link from subject 2 to subject
1, these are two independent projects. After being informed about all the projects to be
executed in their group and about their respective valuations for each of the projects they
are involved in, all subjects simultaneously state their preferences for all projects they are
involved in.
9On the other hand, recall that exogenous budgeting forces the agents to lie if their true distribution of
preference intensities does not perfectly match the underlying distribution. Thus, since endogenous budgets
can have more ﬂexibility, it is in principle even possible that they reach higher eﬃciency than exogenous
ones.
9At the end of each period all subjects are informed about all stated preferences and
implemented project versions in their group. Then they are shown a screen with the history
of all stated preferences of all players in their group. This treatment allows for reputation
building in a more complicated setting than a simple ﬁxed pairing. In particular, in addition
to direct reciprocation as in the stable partnerships treatment, this treatment allows also
for indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building.10 The speciﬁc design of this
treatment is necessary to serve as a benchmark for our next treatment.
Voluntary Link Formation in Stable Groups: Competition for Partnerships
(CMP) This treatment diﬀers from the random link formation treatment only in that
the link originating from each subject is not randomly chosen, but is chosen by the subject.
That is, at the ﬁrst stage of every period, each subject chooses one of the other three sub-
jects as a partner for one project. Then, as in the random link treatment, all subjects are
informed about all links and about their (independently and randomly chosen) preferences
concerning the projects they are involved in. They then choose simultaneously their stated
preferences, and implementation and feed-back is as above in RLK.
By comparing the behavior in this treatment with that in the random link treatment,
we can assess the impact that the competition for partners has on top of the incentives
for reputation building. Being involved in more projects is beneﬁcial because the expected
payoﬀ from each single project is nonnegative. This incentive to increase the number of
partnerships could actually result in subjects being even nicer than truthful and trying to
build a reputation of almost always giving in, which in turn could lead to ineﬃciencies.
2.3 Further Details of the Experimental Implementation
In all our treatments, pairs of players had to decide on a joint project as it has been
described in Section 2.1. In the experiment, a weak (strong) preference corresponded to a
payoﬀ of 30 (60) Pence if the desired version of the project was chosen. In each period,
10See Engelmann and Fischbacher (2003) for experimental evidence that many experimental subjects
are indirectly reciprocal and that they also recognize the incentives for strategic reputation building in an
environment where indirect reciprocity is possible.
10for each of a subject’s decisions (remember that one subject might have been involved in
more than one decision per period), the intensity of preference was drawn randomly and
independently across decisions, periods, and subjects, where each possible intensity (30 or
60) was equally likely. In each treatment, 40 periods were played. The payoﬀ was counted
directly in UK Pence. At the end of the experiment, the earnings were paid in cash in
Pound Sterling.
All experimental sessions were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and were
conducted in the experimental laboratory at Royal Holloway. In each experimental session,
8 to 16 subjects participated. The total number of subjects was 148 (including two control
treatments discussed below). We conducted one session for the treatment with ﬁxed pairs
and two for each of the other treatments. See Table 3 for details.
treatment # subjects in sessions # independent obs. (# sub/obs))
Random Matching RAN 16, 8 3(8)
Exogenous Budgets EXO 16, 8 3(8)
Stable Partnerships FIX 16 8(2)
Random Links RLK 16, 12 7(4)
Competition CMP 12, 16 7(4)
Table 3: Number of subjects, independent observations and subjects per independent ob-
servation for the diﬀerent experimental treatments
Written instructions were distributed at the beginning of the experiment and subjects
could go through them at their own pace. After subjects had answered a set of control
questions, the key features of the experiment were orally summarized by one of the ex-
perimenters (the same in all sessions). The experiments took between 45 and 120 minutes
(including reading the instructions, answering a post-experimental questionnaire and re-
ceiving payments).11 Average earnings ranged from 9.01 (treatment FXI explained below)
to 18.64 (competition treatment) with an overall average of 13.13.12
11There are remarkable diﬀerences in the amount of time the experiment itself took. It ranged from
15-20 minutes in the random matching treatment to 60-80 minutes in the competition treatment.
12Note that the large diﬀerences in average payoﬀs are not due to much more successful cooperation, but
112.4 Measures of Behavior
We now discuss several measures of behavior that help us to assess whether endogenous
budgets arise and that allow us to analyze the extent to which subjects manage to overcome
incentive constraints. Explicit hypotheses that we state in the next section will refer to
these measures. There are two important aspects of behavior that we can compare between
treatments. First, how do the treatment variations aﬀect how honestly subjects represent
their preferences? Second, does this translate into diﬀerences in eﬃciency?
Honesty Rates. We measure how truthfully subjects state their preferences separately
for the case that their true preference is strong or weak. The measures are
Hs =




#truthfully stated weak preferences
#true weak preferences
(2)
Eﬃciency. The eﬃciency is measured in expected terms with respect to the random draws
in case of equal stated preferences.
Denote by i and j the two players involved in a project p. Denote the maximum





p} and the minimum







p is the payoﬀ of
player k, k = i,j, if his preferred version of the project is chosen, i.e. the true intensity







p ∗ (1 − Win
i
p) denotes
the in project p actually realized surplus, where Win
i
p is a dummy that is 1 if the preferred
version of player i has been chosen. If both players state diﬀerent preferences, Sreal
p is just
equal to the preference of the player who stated the stronger preference.
In case of equal stated preferences, whose preferred version of the project will be chosen
is determined by a random draw. Since we do not want our measure of eﬃciency to be
inﬂuenced by the outcome of this random draw, we consider the expected achieved surplus
primarily occur because there are twice as many projects per subject in RLK and CMP as in the other
treatments.
12(given the preferences drawn and the behavior in the experiment but taking expectations
with respect to the allocation),
E[S
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+ (1 − Equalp) ∗ S
real
p , (3)
where Equalp is a dummy that is 1 if both players state equal preferences and 0 otherwise.
Our measure for eﬃciency is then given by the (expected) increase in payoﬀ over the
minimum possible payoﬀ that the players achieve, relative to the maximum increase they
could possibly achieve. We call this measure the expected eﬃciency,
E[Ep] =
E[Sreal






This measure is then unaﬀected by the outcome of the random draw which takes place if
both players state equal preferences. For a single project, the denominator will be zero
if both players have the same true preference, so the expected eﬃciency would not be
properly deﬁned. We will, however, only consider aggregate measures (across periods),
such that this problem does not occur in practice. Expected eﬃciency will be computed
based on aggregates, i.e. we ﬁrst sum over the maximum, minimum, and expected realized
payoﬀs and then calculate the expected eﬃciency as follows (where 1,...,P denote the











Note that if players always state their preferences truthfully, then E[E] = 1 and if they
follow the stage–game Nash–equilibrium strategy to always state a strong preference, then
E[E] = 1
2.
3 Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses
3.1 The Beneﬁts from Cooperation
We start by illustrating the possible beneﬁts from linking decisions (either through ex-
ogenous budgets or through conditionally cooperative behavior). We present the possible
13eﬃciency gains from honest behavior as compared to (stage–game Nash–)equilibrium play.
Suppose (analogously to the choice of parameters in our experimental setting) that the two
preference intensities satisfy s = 2w. Denote by EU(x,y) an agent’s expected payoﬀ from
behavior x if the other plays y, x,y ∈ {h,s,w}, where h stands for honest behavior, and s
(w) for always reporting strong (weak) preferences.13 The expected payoﬀs are displayed










































Table 4: Expected payoﬀs from being honest, tough, and nice, ﬁrst number for row player,
second for column player.
As it turns out, honest play by both agents increases the expected total payoﬀ by
approximately 16.7 %, relative to the (stage–game) equilibrium payoﬀ. However, if the
other player is always reporting honestly, the incentive for one player to always state a
strong preference is higher than the eﬃciency gain from mutual honest behavior (i.e. it
raises his payoﬀ by 28.6 % compared to being honest as well). Finally, observe that given
the other player always reports a strong preference, doing the same even increases a player’s
payoﬀ by 50 % compared to honest behavior.
3.2 Equilibria
As argued above, in the one–shot game it is a dominant strategy to always report a strong
preference. This is also the prediction for each repetition of the stage game if match-
ing is random and players cannot identify players they interact(ed) with. Thus the only
equilibrium in RAN is that players always state a strong preference.
13We are slightly abusing the notation here, by using s both to denote a strong preference and the
strategy to state a strong preference irrespective of the true preference (and correspondingly for w).
14For treatment EXO, it follows from Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) that it is a
Bayesian equilibrium to state preferences as truthfully as possible within the budget. That
is, a player would state his true preference until either the remaining budget for strong
preferences is 0 (in which case he has to state a weak preference in all remaining periods
regardless of his true preference) or equals the number of remaining periods (in which case
he can state a strong preference for all remaining periods). Unless players draw extreme
sequences of preferences, in this equilibrium preferences are generally reported truthfully
except possibly the last few periods. Honesty and expected eﬃciency would hence almost
be equal to those under truthful representation, i.e. E[E] ≈ 1.
In treatments FIX and RLK, we observe that in the last period, there is no reason
to deviate from the stage–game dominant strategy to report a strong preference. By a
standard backward–induction argument, the same holds for the ﬁnitely repeated game.
Hence the only subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is to report a strong preference for each
project independent of the true preference.
It is, however, a well–established result that experimental subjects do generally not
perform backward induction over many stages. Thus, they may approach a game that is
repeated many times like an inﬁnitely repeated game until end–game eﬀects kick in close
to the end. It is therefore reasonable to consider equilibria for inﬁnitely repeated games.
Following from Folk–theorem arguments, there are many possible equilibria that players
could follow and this gives rise to a selection problem. For treatment FIX, we show below
that there is a relatively simple equilibrium where players manage to link the decisions
in two periods. For treatment RLK, we ﬁnd a similar equilibrium where players link the
projects in each period and take information about all the players in the group into account.
For CMP we will see that even in the ﬁnitely repeated game there is an equilibrium that
exploits the opportunity to link projects.
We start by considering FIX. While there are many more equilibria, the one suggested
here is the most simple one that makes use of the repeated game to achieve some eﬃciency
gains through linking decisions. Given that coordinating on any such equilibrium is diﬃcult,
this arguably most simple equilibrium that allows for limited eﬃciency gains seems an
appropriate benchmark to assess how well experimental subjects exploit the opportunities
to endogenously link decisions. In contrast, it would clearly not come as a surprise if
15players do not manage to coordinate on highly complicated nearly eﬃcient equilibria. For
simplicity, we consider payoﬀs to be w = 1 and s = 2 in the following.
Proposition 1 (FIX) In the inﬁnitely repeated game with ﬁxed matching between two
players (as in FIX), the following constitutes a subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium.14 Players
consider periods in (disjoint) blocks of two and adopt the following trigger strategy: state
one strong and one weak preference (truthfully if possible, randomly otherwise) in a block
of two periods if both players have done so in the past. If one player deviates, always state
strong preferences for 16 periods, then go back to the pattern of one strong and one weak
preference. The ex–ante (i.e. before preferences are drawn) expected payoﬀ per period in
this equilibrium is 13
16. The ex–ante expected honesty rates are Hw = Hs = 3
4.
Proof See Appendix B. 
The ex–ante expected payoﬀ when both players are always honest (which leads to the
maximum possible payoﬀ) is 7
8, while the ex-ante expected payoﬀ in the stage–game Nash
equilibrium is 3
4 (see Appendix A). Thus the above equilibrium would allow the players to
obtain half of the possible eﬃciency gains of perfect honesty compared to the stage–game
Nash equilibrium, or E[E] = 3
4.15
For treatment RLK the situation is more diﬃcult, as the number of projects per period
for an individual player is random and in particular, the number of projects per period
can be uneven. On the other hand, the fact that players frequently have more than one
project per period makes it possible to link these projects and allows for some eﬃciency
gains from linking without having to link projects across periods. We thus consider such
14We ignore discounting for the moment. In an experiment, it is plausible to assume that players do not
discount later periods, because they obtain the payoﬀs for all periods only at the end of the experiment.
Thus, it makes sense to consider players treating the game as if it had an inﬁnite horizon, but without
discounting, even though in a theoretical model this implies conceptual problems of comparing inﬁnite
payoﬀs. Here it has the advantage to give us a minimal length of a punishment phase. We will address
discounting below.
15For any speciﬁc set of preferences, E[E] might be higher or lower in the given equilibrium, but in
expectation it equals 3
4.
16an (inﬁnitely repeated game) equilibrium that makes use of the opportunity to link several
projects within one period, but would not link projects across periods. Again, the reason
to consider this equilibrium is that it is arguably the easiest and the eﬃciency gains are
relatively small, so that it is not too demanding a benchmark to compare the experimental
behavior to.
A crucial aspect of RLK is that any deviation from a cooperative strategy can be
observed by all three other players in the group and hence can attract relatively harsh
punishment. Furthermore, punishment can be targeted to the deviator and thus cooperation
through honesty among other group members does not have to be ended as a result of a
deviation by one player even if they play a grim–trigger strategy. To ease the derivation
of the equilibrium, we will, however, consider a trigger strategy that leads to temporary
complete breakdown of cooperation. The incentives for a player not to deviate would be the
same and hence the length of the punishment phase would not be aﬀected if punishment
was targeted to him, but it would complicate the analysis for the other players on the
punishment path.
Given that in expectation a player has a strong preference for half of his projects, a
reasonable assumption is that to avoid punishment a player with two projects in a period
or with four projects would be required to state half of the preferences as weak. In case
the number of projects is one or three, we assume the milder of two obvious possible
requirements, namely that for one project there is no restriction, and for three projects,
the player has to state only one weak preference. Requiring to state one and two weak
preferences, respectively, would not lead to additional eﬃciency gains, but would make
deviation more likely.
Proposition 2 (RLK) In the inﬁnitely repeated game with random link formation in a
ﬁxed group of four players (as in RLK), the following constitutes a subgame–perfect Nash
equilibrium.16 Players consider one period at a time and adopt the following trigger strategy:
for one project, state a strong preference, for two or three projects, state one weak preference
and for four projects, state two weak preferences if all players have followed this pattern in
16We again ignore discounting for the moment.
17the past. State preferences as truthfully as possible given these restrictions. If one player
deviates, always state strong preferences for all projects for 19 periods, then go back to
the above pattern. The ex–ante expected payoﬀ per period in this equilibrium is 695
432. The
ex–ante expected honesty rates are Hw = 127
216 ≈ 58.8% and Hs = 61
72 ≈ 84.7%.17
Proof See Appendix B. 
If players state preferences honestly, the expected payoﬀ per project is 7
8 (see Appendix
A). Since each player has in expectation two projects, the expected payoﬀ per period given
truthful representation is thus 7
4. The ex–ante expected payoﬀ in the stage–game Nash
equilibrium is 3
4 per project, so 3
2 per period. Thus the above equilibrium would allow the
players to obtain 695−648
756−648 = 47
108 ≈ 43.5% of the possible eﬃciency gains of perfect honesty
compared to the stage–game Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1 If we introduce discounting, we see that for a suﬃciently high discount factor,
a grim–trigger strategy that switches to always stating a strong preference but is otherwise
as above, yields a subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium in both FIX and RLK. For simplicity,
assume for FIX that there is no discounting between the two periods in a block and let δ
denote the discount factor between two blocks. Then deviating does not pay if the discounted




8 > 1 ⇔ δ
1−δ > 8 ⇔ δ > 8
9. For RLK, since only projects in one period
are linked, we can consider discounting in the standard way, so δ denotes the discount
factor between two periods. Then deviating does not pay if the discounted loss of entering
the punishment phase is larger than the (maximum) immediate gain from deviating, or
P∞
i=1 δi 47
432 > 2 ⇔ δ
1−δ > 864
47 ⇔ δ > 864
911.
Remark 2 We could observe similar equilibria for FIX and RLK even for the ﬁnitely
repeated game if there are (or players assume that there are) some intrinsically honest
17Hw < Hs in this equilibrium, because players who have one or three projects state more strong than
weak preferences, so strong preferences get more honestly represented than weak ones.
18players18, who would, however, punish dishonest others. In these equilibria, players would
try to signal honesty by not excessively overstating preferences. Again, many such equilibria
are possible, depending on what would be considered unmistakable evidence that a player is
dishonest. The most simple equilibrium would again involve linking the decisions in a block
of two periods in FIX and linking the decisions in one period in RLK. Honesty would decline
towards the end and this would happen earlier the lower the assumed share of intrinsically
honest players.
The theoretical analysis of treatment CMP diﬀers in a crucial aspect from that of FIX
and RLK. As we will see, the choice of partners allows for the linking of decisions to emerge
in a subgame–perfect equilibrium even in the ﬁnitely repeated game.19 Thus in CMP the
prediction that players might be able to endogenize a budget does not rely on the assumption
that they treat the game as if it were inﬁnitely repeated (or there were some intrinsically
honest players that others try to mimic). We again consider only minimal linking, that
is the linking of two projects within a period rather than more eﬃcient linking across
several periods. The motivation is again that this is the least demanding equilibrium that
makes use of the opportunity to link projects and thus establishes an arguably appropriate
benchmark for the experimental behavior.
Proposition 3 (CMP) In the ﬁnitely repeated two-stage game where players ﬁrst choose
a partner for the project originating with them and then state preferences for all their
projects (as in CMP), the following constitutes a subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium.20 Let
the number of periods be n. Players consider one period at a time and adopt the following
trigger strategy: in the ﬁrst stage, two pairs form endogenously, that is two players, respec-
tively, choose each other and hence share two projects.21 In the second stage, both players
18For example, this could be players who actually care for eﬃciency as suggested by Charness and Rabin
(2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
19Ule (2006) presents a more general analysis for prisoner’s dilemmas with corresponding results.
20Since we consider the ﬁnitely repeated game, we can ignore discounting.
21There is obviously a coordination problem in practise, but over the course of a few periods, this should
19in each pair state one strong and one weak preference. Both players continue in this fashion
until period n−2 if they have done so in the past. In period n−1, they will state two strong
preferences if they have indeed two strong preferences but again one weak and one strong
otherwise. In period n, if no player stated two strong preferences before, they still choose
each other but state two strong preferences. If player i deviates by stating preferences other
than one strong and one weak in any period, then for the rest of the game, player j (the
“partner” of i) chooses another player, while player i continues to choose j and they both
state strong preferences.22 If a player is chosen by a player from a diﬀerent pair, he states
a strong preference for the resulting project. The ex–ante expected payoﬀ per period in this
equilibrium is 13
8 . The ex–ante expected honesty rates are Hw = Hs = 3
4.
Proof See Appendix B. 
As in the equilibrium for the inﬁnitely repeated game of FIX, in this equilibrium, always
two projects are linked and thus the ex–ante expected payoﬀ per period (except for the last
two periods) is 13
8 . The expected payoﬀ from two projets and perfect honesty is 7
4 and in
the stage–game Nash equilibrium it is 3
2. Hence as for FIX, the above equilibrium allows
players to reap half of the eﬃciency gains that would be obtained from perfect honesty
compared to the stage–game Nash equilibrium.
Even though calculating the subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium is certainly demanding
for the subjects, its logic is fairly obvious. In addition to keeping an endogenously formed
pair intact, players might also want to appear honest because in the initial phase where
pairs are formed, one would want to attract a potential partner and furthermore, they might
attract even an additional project if the remaining two players do not form an equilibrium
pair. Thus in CMP, apparent honesty not only possibly triggers reciprocal honesty but can
also attract partners and hence increase the number of projects, which directly increases
the expected payoﬀs.
be relatively easy to sort out.
22There are obvious alternatives for the punishment path. In particular, both players could choose
diﬀerent partners. We focus on this pattern since it minimizes the number of cases to be considered.
20To summarize, we have an almost eﬃcient, almost perfectly honest subgame–perfect
equilibrium in EXO. For CMP, we have a relatively simple subgame–perfect equilibrium
with endogenous pair formation and limited honesty and eﬃciency gains. For FIX and RLK
we have such equilibria only for the inﬁnitely repeated game (or as signalling equilibria),
hence these are applicable only if players perceive the game as inﬁnite (or if there are
some truly honest players). Hence it appears more likely that players will approximate the
behavior of an equilibrium with partial linking in CMP than in RLK and FIX. For RAN,
repeated dominant–strategy play is the only plausible theoretical prediction.
3.3 Hypotheses
Based on our theoretical results, we derive the following hypotheses.
(H1) With random matching (RAN) subjects are expected to play the stage–game equilib-
rium, therefore




(H2) With exogenous budgets (EXO) subjects are expected to use their budgets rationally
and therefore should approximately reach honest representation and eﬃciency.
Hw(EXO) ≈ 1, Hs(EXO) ≈ 1, E[E] ≈ 1.
(H3) Fixed matching in pairs (FIX) or groups of four (RLK) should lead to more honest
representation of weak preferences than random matching (RAN), but to less honest
representation than exogenous budgets (EXO). Eﬃciency in FIX and RLK should
thus be between the levels in RAN and in EXO.
Hw(RAN) < Hw(FIX) < Hw(EXO)
Hw(RAN) < Hw(RLK) < Hw(EXO)
E[E](RAN) < E[E](FIX) < E[E](EXO)
E[E](RAN) < E[E](RLK) < E[E](EXO).
21(H4) Competition for partners should lead to more honest representation of weak prefer-
ences than RLK and FIX, but to less honest representation than in EXO. Represen-
tation of strong preferences should be less honest than in FIX and RLK. Eﬃciency
in CMP should be higher than in FIX and RLK, but lower than in EXO.
Hw(RLK),Hw(FIX) < Hw(CMP) < Hw(EXO)
Hs(CMP) < Hs(RLK),Hs(FIX)
E[E](RLK),E[E](FIX) < E[E](CMP) < E[E](EXO)
4 Results
In the following we ﬁrst compare honesty rates in the diﬀerent experimental treatments.
We will then examine how this translates into diﬀerences in eﬃciency.
4.1 Results - Honesty
The average levels of truthful representation of strong and weak preferences are found in
Tables 5 and 6.
Hw Hs
treatment data EQ prediction data EQ prediction
RAN 7.0% 0% 97.2% 100%
EXO 85.7% (88.7%) 100% 84.9% (89.3%) 100%
Table 5: Share of truthfully represented weak and strong preferences for RAN and EXO,
data and ex–ante equilibrium predictions. The numbers in parentheses for EXO correct for
forced lies due to a depleted budget (Hs) or for free lies due to a full budget (Hw).
Let us ﬁrst look at the behavior in treatments RAN and EXO (Table 5). As expected,
players in RAN generally state a strong preference, i.e. they misrepresent their preferences
if they are weak (truthful representation in only 7% of the cases where a weak preference
was observed) but truthfully represent their preferences when they are strong. Indeed 12
22out of 24 subjects always state a strong preferences irrespective of their true preference,
another ﬁve always state a strong preference when this is their true preference. Hence,
we ﬁnd clear support for our ﬁrst hypothesis and establish that the incentive problem is
empirically relevant. While this result should not come as a surprise to a theorist, it is
noteworthy that the rates of truthful representation of weak preferences (which can be seen
as a measure of cooperativeness) is lower than cooperation rates that have been observed,
for example, in prisoner’s dilemma games with random matching.23
In the treatment with exogenous budgets, the picture is remarkably diﬀerent. Players
overwhelmingly report their preferences truthfully, supporting our second hypothesis. It is
interesting to note that the rate of truthful representation of strong preferences is substan-
tially lower than in RAN (84.9%). Partly this is due to the fact that the budget becomes
binding for some players in the last few periods, i.e. they are forced to “lie downwards”.
Even if we correct for this, however, the share of truthfully represented strong preferences
rises to only 89.3%. Statements in the post–experimental questionnaire indicate that some
subjects became worried of spending their budget too fast when they had many strong
preferences in the ﬁrst periods and wanted to save their budget for later. Similarly, if we
correct for “free lies”, i.e. when players have a suﬃcient budget to state a strong preference
in all the remaining periods, Hw increases from 85.7% to 88.7%. Overall we ﬁnd that the
Jackson–Sonnenschein mechanism works remarkably well as it achieves almost perfectly
truthful revelation (although, even after correcting for forced and free lies, only 4 out of
24 players always report their preferences truthfully). According to a Mann–Whitney test,
using the matching groups as independent observations, aggregating across all pairs and
all periods within each matching group, in EXO Hw is signiﬁcantly higher and Hs is sig-
niﬁcantly lower than in RAN (p = 10%, note that for three independent observations per
treatment, this is the smallest possible p.)
We summarize the main results from the baseline treatments in Results 1 and 2.
Result 1 The incentive problem is empirically relevant since in RAN subjects overwhelm-
ingly play their dominant strategy to state a strong preference.
23Cooper et al. (1996) report cooperation rates of 22% in the last ten periods of a prisoner’s dilemma
game with random matching across 20 periods.
23Result 2 The Jackson–Sonnenschein mechanism (EXO) achieves a signiﬁcant improve-
ment. Stated preferences are overwhelmingly truthful. Subjects partly understate their pref-
erences, either because a depleted budget forces them to do so or because they are afraid of
spending it too quickly.
We now turn to treatments FIX, RLK and CMP (see Table 6), to investigate how well
social interaction can help to overcome the incentive constraints without an exogenously
enforced budget.
Hw Hs
treatment data EQ prediction data EQ prediction
RAN 7.0% 0% 97.2% 100%
EXO 85.7% (88.7%) 100% 84.9% (89.3%) 100%
FIX 11.6% 75% 97.9% 75%
RLK 12.8% 58.8 % 98.2% 84.7%
CMP 30.9% 75% 93.8% 75%
Table 6: Share of truthfully represented weak and strong preferences for FIX, RLK, and
CMP, data and ex–ante equilibrium predictions.
The honesty rates in FIX and RLK do not diﬀer substantially or signiﬁcantly from
those in RAN. Essentially, it appears that repeated interaction has hardly any eﬀect on the
honesty of represented preferences. Thus we do not ﬁnd support for our third hypothesis.
In contrast, competition has a notable eﬀect on the honesty rates. Weak preferences
are represented honestly in 30.9%, in contrast to 12.8% in the random links treatment.
Hw is signiﬁcantly higher in CMP than in RLK, FIX, or RAN (Mann–Whitney, p < 5%,
using aggregate measures for groups of four, ﬁxed pairs, or matching groups as independent
observations). Furthermore, strong preferences are represented signiﬁcantly less honestly
in CMP than in FIX or RLK (Mann–Whitney, p < 5%) or RAN (p < 10%). That means,
in line with our fourth hypothesis, in CMP players state a weak preference more frequently
than in RAN, FIX, and RLK, both if their true preference is weak and if it is strong.24
24How the players actually choose their partners in CMP will be discussed below.
24Although these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant, they are substantially smaller than the eﬀect of
the exogenous budget. In particular, Hw is signiﬁcantly smaller and Hs signiﬁcantly larger
in CMP than in EXO (Mann–Whitney, p < 5%), as predicted.
If we consider the honesty rates relative to the equilibrium predictions, we again ﬁnd
that Hw is substantially and signiﬁcantly higher in CMP (41.2%), than in RLK (21.8%),
(p < 10%), and FIX (15.5%), (p < 5%), but less than half that of EXO, (p < 5%). Strong
preferences are stated more honestly relative to the equilibrium to a similar degree in CMP
(125%), in RLK (115.9%) and in FIX (130.5%) (the diﬀerences are actually all signiﬁcant
at p < 5%).
We summarize these observations as follows.
Result 3 Repeated interaction in pairs (treatment FIX) or in groups of four without the
chance of choosing partners (treatment RLK) has essentially no eﬀect on honesty rates.
Result 4 If players can choose partners for the interaction (treatment CMP), this signif-
icantly increases the rate of truthfully stated weak preferences and signiﬁcantly reduces the
rate of truthfully stated strong preferences compared to treatments RAN, FIX, and RLK.
These eﬀects, are however, substantially and signiﬁcantly weaker than those induced by the
exogenous budgets (EXO).
To summarize, the types of social interaction that we investigate are by far not as eﬀec-
tive as the Jackson–Sonnenschein budgeting mechanism in encouraging honest statements
of preferences.
4.2 Results - Eﬃciency
In this section, we report how the diﬀerent behavior translates into eﬃciency diﬀerences
among the treatments. The expected eﬃciency aggregated across all periods is presented
in Table 7 alongside the aggregate across the ﬁrst ten periods.
As we can see, most treatments achieve eﬃciency levels only slightly above the stage–
game Nash–equilibrium value of 50%, whereas the exogenous budget treatment almost
reaches full eﬃciency. Correcting for the fact that depleted budgets force players to state
25treatment Expected Eﬃciency Exp. Eﬀ. Periods 1-10 Equil. Exp. Eﬀ.
RAN 52.4% 58.4% 50%
EXO 87.2% (89.1%) 91.2% 100%
FIX 55.0% 55.8% 75%
RLK 55.9% 59.4% 71.8%
CMP 62.1% 70.3% 75%
Table 7: Expected eﬃciency in the diﬀerent experimental treatments. The number in
parentheses for EXO corrects for forced or free lies due to a depleted or full budget. The
third column shows the expected eﬃciency in Periods 1 to 10 and the fourth column the
ex–ante expected eﬃciency in equilibrium.
weak preferences when their true preferences are strong, about 80% of the possible eﬃciency
gains compared to the stage–game Nash equilibrium are achieved. The expected eﬃciency
is signiﬁcantly higher than in each of the other treatments (Mann–Whitney tests, p ≤ 10%).
Among the other treatments, only the competition treatment achieves signiﬁcantly higher
expected eﬃciency than treatments RAN, FIX, and RLK (Mann–Whitney tests, p < 10%).
In no other pair of treatments does expected eﬃciency diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Compared to the
diﬀerence in the rates of truthful representations Hs and Hw, the diﬀerences in expected
eﬃciency between CMP and the other treatments are relatively small. This is so because the
eﬃciency gains due to more truthful revelation of weak preferences are partly compensated
by the more frequent misrepresentation of strong preferences. In line with our fourth
hypothesis, however, we ﬁnd that the positive eﬀect dominates.
In all treatments, there are initially more attempts to cooperate (or also possibly more
errors) such that the expected eﬃciency in the ﬁrst ten periods is higher than in the overall
data. As shown in Table 7, the eﬀect is, however, smaller in FIX and RLK than in RAN and
largest in CMP. As a result, in periods 1 to 10, the diﬀerence between expected eﬃciency
in CMP and in RAN, FIX, and RLK is now signiﬁcant even at p < 5% (Mann–Whitney).
Indeed, in all treatments, Hw is higher, but in RAN, FIX and RLK by only 4 to 6 percentage
points, while it reaches 43.5% in CMP (compared to 30.9% across all periods.) Hence the
26diﬀerences between treatments are initially stronger.25
If we consider the eﬃciency gains relative to the gains in the suggested benchmark
equilibria compared to the stage–game Nash equilibrium, we ﬁnd that in EXO 74.4% of the
equilibrium eﬃciency gains are captured, while it is only 20% in FIX and 27.1% in RLK,
but 48.4% in CMP. CMP diﬀers signiﬁcantly neither from RLK nor EXO (p > 10%), while
CMP still diﬀers signiﬁcantly from FIX (p < 10%), and EXO from RLK (p < 10%) and
FIX (p < 5%). Thus even relative to the more modest plausible equilibrium benchmarks,
only CMP is reaching substantial eﬃciency gains, while these are still much lower than in
EXO.
There is also a lot of heterogeneity among groups within treatments. For example, one
group in RLK achieved 81.3% of the equilibrium eﬃciency gains, while no other group
reaches more than 40%. In FIX, one pair reaches 71.4% of equilibrium eﬃciency gains,
but three pairs obtain exactly the stage–game Nash eﬃciency. CMP shows generally higher
eﬃciency levels with three of seven groups reaching more than 60% of equilibrium eﬃciency
gains and even six being above 25%. In contrast, in EXO all three independent groups
obtain 72% or more of the equilibrium eﬃciency gains (if we control for depleted budgets
even more than 76%.)
Summarizing our results, we ﬁnd clear support for our hypotheses that random matching
without exogenous budgets leads to nearly stage–game Nash–equilibrium play (Hypothesis
1) and that exogenous budgets are most eﬀective in increasing truthful representation of
weak preferences and that this leads to nearly full eﬃciency (Hypothesis 2). We also ﬁnd
support for the hypothesis that weak preferences are stated more truthfully and strong
preferences less truthfully in CMP than in RLK and FIX and that this translates into
higher expected eﬃciency (Hypothesis 4). Contrary to Hypothesis 3, ﬁxed matching in
pairs or groups of four and the possibility of reputation building has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
neither on honesty rates nor on expected eﬃciency. Based on these (partly surprising)
results, in the next section we try to isolate what drives successful cooperative behavior in
our environment of two–sided private information.
25In all treatments, Hs is marginally smaller in the ﬁrst ten periods and in EXO, Hw is marginally higher.
275 What Drives Successful Cooperation?
Our above results show that in our experimental setting social interaction has little or no
eﬀects on the representation of preferences unless players can choose their partners. At
a ﬁrst glance, this appears to be surprising, since in simpler games (like trust games or
prisoner’s dilemma games) repeated interaction, like in FIX, usually increases cooperation
substantially. In other experiments, in settings similar to RLK, the opportunity to build
a reputation enables subjects to cooperate (for example in trust games or helping games,
see, e.g., Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2003). While we ﬁnd that the choice of partners has
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on eﬃciency, they are not as dramatic as, e.g., in the trust game (see
Huck, L¨ unser, and Tyran, 2006).
We will now address possible explanations for the observed failure of cooperation in FIX
and RLK and the relatively low eﬃciency gains in CMP. Two further treatments will help
us evaluate these explanations. The most plausible reasons are the following:
1. The signals are ambiguous. A player cannot observe whether the other player lied
or not and does not know whether repeatedly stated strong preferences are a true
reﬂection of randomly chosen preferences or the result of exaggeration. As a result,
no simple strategy like tit–for–tat in honesty is possible. A conditionally cooperative
strategy can only use stochastic information. This implies the next problem.
2. Players clearly face a coordination problem. Even if they want to play conditionally
cooperative, they have to implicitly agree which horizon is chosen to judge the other’s
honesty. That means one player has to know in what cases the other will judge his
behavior as a sign of dishonesty and will revert to punishment. Learning the other’s
strategy (or the others’ strategies in RLK and CMP) would take a considerable num-
ber of periods for experimentation. Put diﬀerently, while a conditionally cooperative
strategy implies a budget for the other player, it is far more diﬃcult to communicate
than an exogenous budget.
3. Finally, understanding the possible gains from cooperation and understanding that it
is possible to play a conditionally cooperative strategy based on stochastic information
is intellectually relatively demanding and both players (or all four in RLK) must
understand this in order to coordinate on cooperation through mutual honesty.
28Note that the last problem is substantially reduced if players can choose each other as
in CMP. Here, if two out of four players understand how to reap gains from cooperation,
they can choose each other and endogenously form a cooperating pair. We will discuss
below that this is exactly what happens in several groups and that this drives the observed
diﬀerences in behavior. First, we describe two control treatments that we ran in order to
test explanations number 1 and 2 above.26
Control Treatment I: Fixed pairs with ex–post complete information, FXI The
treatment is identical to “Stable Partnerships” (FIX), except for the fact that, at the end
of each period, in addition to the stated preferences, both players observe also the true
preference of the other player. This implies that honesty is now directly observable, so
reciprocity does not have to rely on stochastic methods and there is no need to budget
decisions.
Control Treatment II: Fixed pairs with multiple projects per period, F4P The
treatment is identical to “Stable Partnerships” (FIX), except for the fact that each pair
decided on four independent projects each period. This could enable the players to overcome
the problem of coordinating on a speciﬁc conditionally cooperative strategy and hence on
the number of projects that should be linked as it suggests to link the four projects within
each period. The payoﬀs for strong (weak) preferences where reduced to 20p (10p) in order
to compensate for the higher number of projects and leave hourly wages comparable to the
other treatments.
The ﬁrst problem discussed above is in principle eliminated if players can ex–post ob-
serve each others’ true preferences. In this case, they can clearly assess each others’ honesty
and hence have suﬃcient information to play simple strategies like tit–for–tat in honesty.
Our control treatment FXI implements such ex–post information. Indeed if we again con-
sider that players perceive the game as inﬁnitely repeated, we can easily establish honest
representation as an equilibrium.
26We ran one session with 14 subjects of each treatment. Given the ﬁxed matching this yields 7 inde-
pendent observations each.
29Proposition 4 In the inﬁnitely repeated game with ﬁxed matching between two players and
ex–post information about the intensity of preferences (as in FXI), the following constitutes
a subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium.27 Players state their preferences truthfully if both
players have done so in the past. If it becomes known at the end of a period that a player
misrepresented his preference, both players state always strong preferences for four periods
and then go back to honest representation. The ex–ante expected payoﬀ per period in this
equilibrium is 7
8, and the ex–ante expected honesty rates are Hw = Hs = 1.
Proof See Appendix B. 
Concerning the second problem discussed above, coordinating on a budget should be
facilitated in our second control treatment F4P where, within a ﬁxed pair, players decide
about four independent projects simultaneously in every period. This suggests to assign
each other a budget per period, most likely either two or possibly at most three strong stated
preferences. Deviations from this budget could then be retaliated in the next period(s).
Such a strategy could relatively easily be signaled and would lead already to substantial
improvements in truthful revelation of weak preferences (but would also imply a decrease
in the truthful revelation of strong preferences). While it would further increase truthful
revelation if projects were linked across periods, this would again be diﬃcult and hence we
would expect short–term budgeting. We consider here the case of linking only the projects
within a period and assigning a budget of two strong preferences.
Proposition 5 In the inﬁnitely repeated game with ﬁxed matching between two players
and four projects in each period (as in F4P), the following constitutes a subgame–perfect
Nash equilibrium.28 Players play the following trigger strategy: state two strong and two
weak strategies (as truthfully as possible, randomly otherwise) in each period if both players
have done so in the past. If one player deviates, always state strong preferences for seven
periods, then go back to the pattern of two strong and two weak preferences. The ex–ante
27We again ignore discounting for the moment.
28We ignore again discounting for the moment.
30expected payoﬀ per period in this equilibrium is 53
16. The ex–ante expected honesty rates are
Hw = Hs = 13
16.
Proof See Appendix B. 
Note that if the players perceive the game as inﬁnitely repeated in FXI, they reach
the maximum expected eﬃciency in a relatively straightforward equilibrium. In F4P the
expected payoﬀ of perfect honesty is 4· 7
8 = 7
2, while the expected payoﬀ in the stage-game
Nash equilibrium is 4 · 3
4 = 3, so the expected eﬃciency gain in the above equilibrium is
(53
16 − 3)/(7
2 − 3) = 5
8 of the gain that would be reached through perfect honesty compared
to stage–game Nash behavior. The expected eﬃciency gain is larger than in the discussed
equilibria of CMP or FIX, because four projects are linked and not just two.
If we again consider discounting, it is straightforward to see that we can establish
the path in FXI as equilibrium through a grim–trigger strategy if δ > 4
5 and in F4P if
P∞
i=1 δi 5
16 > 2 ⇔ δ
1−δ > 32
5 ⇔ δ > 32
37.
treatment Hw Hs Exp. Eﬃciency
RAN 7.0% [0%] 97.2% [100%] 52.4% [50%]
EXO 85.7% (88.7%) [100%] 84.9% (89.3%) [100%] 87.2% (89.1%) [100%]
FIX 11.6% [75%] 97.9% [75%] 55.0% [75%]
RLK 12.8% [58.8%] 98.2% [84.7%] 55.9% [71.8%]
CMP 30.9% [75%] 93.8% [75%] 62.1% [75%]
FXI 5.6% [100%] 98.8% [100%] 52.4 [100%]
F4P 19.1% [81.3%] 92.4% [81.3%] 56.6 [81.3%]
Table 8: Share of truthfully represented weak and strong preferences and expected eﬃciency
for FXI and F4P. In brackets the ex–ante predicted equilibrium values for each treatment.
Table 8 relates the honesty rates and expected eﬃciency in the two control treatments
to those in the other treatments and the equilibrium predictions. There is essentially no
eﬀect of the ex–post information in FXI. If anything, it leads to even more frequently stated
strong preferences. As a result, eﬃciency is virtually the same as in FIX. Indeed, pairs are
31locked even quicker in a “strong–strong” state than in the other treatments. It appears that
some players actually followed a grim–trigger strategy, reverting to constantly stating strong
preferences after they observed the other “lied upwards” only once. The failure to achieve
cooperation in this treatment seems to be driven again by coordination problems and by
slower understanding of some players. The subjects in our experiment generally seem to
be impatient and unforgiving. In most treatments, according to post-experimental ques-
tionnaires, some subjects overestimate their own honesty and underestimate the honesty of
others. They then punish people for being dishonest that are not less honest than they are
themselves. Interestingly, this eﬀect does not even disappear if subjects can actually judge
the other’s honesty equally well as their own.
As we can also see from Table 8, in F4P there is some increase in Hw compared to
RAN or FIX, but the eﬀect is weaker than in CMP. Indeed, only the diﬀerence with FXI
is signiﬁcant (p < 5%). There is also a notable decrease in Hs. Since the increase of Hw is
partly canceled by the decrease in Hs, the increase in eﬃciency compared to FIX is very
small and insigniﬁcant.29 In particular, if we consider again the eﬃciency gains relative
to the equilibrium gains compared to the stage–game Nash equilibrium, we ﬁnd that only
21.1% of these gains are captured, virtually identical to the result for FIX.
Therefore, it appears that substantially reducing the coordination problem alone does
not enable pairs of players to coordinate on relatively truthful representation of preferences.
Even when measured against the more reasonable benchmark of the equilibrium where in
each period subjects are restricted to a 2–strong–2–weak–budget, our subjects exaggerate
their preferences quite frequently, but state strong preferences more honestly.30
So why do subjects on average represent weak preferences more truthfully in the compe-
tition treatment? The main reason appears to be that the competition treatment reduces
29If we again restrict attention to the ﬁrst ten periods, we ﬁnd expected eﬃciency only marginally
increased compared to the complete data, to 52.6% in FXI and to 59.7% in F4P. This is driven by a
larger Hw (29.7% in F4P, 12.3% in FXI), but partly compensated by Hs being marginally smaller in both
treatments.
30We also calculated the honesty rates given the draw of preferences observed in the experiment and the
equilibrium strategy. This would yield honesty rates of Hw = 81.0% and Hs = 79.8%, very close to the
ex–ante expected rates.
32the third, and partly also the second of the problems that we stated at the beginning of
this section. If two out of four players understand the gains from mutually truthful repre-
sentation of preferences, they can signal this by stating some weak preferences. They can
then choose each other as partners for their projects. Hence the third problem is reduced.
If two subjects in a group of four see the way to reap gains from cooperation, this will
at least lead them to truthful representation. We see indeed very clear examples of this
kind of endogenous pairing in three of our seven groups. Interesting is the reaction of the
remaining two players. Partly, they also choose these two players, because the latter state
a weak preference more frequently, allowing the former to gain a higher payoﬀ. In one
group, however, the remaining two players choose each other, but always state a strong
preference.31
The competition treatment also partly solves the second problem. If a pair forms en-
dogenously, they share two projects each period. Thus, as suggested by the subgame–perfect
equilibrium presented above, they can link these two projects and hence allow each other
to state only one strong preference per period.
Another cooperation facilitating property of this treatment is that it allows unambigu-
ous punishment. In the other treatments, the only way to punish a player is to state a
strong preference in the next interaction with him. This, however, is not clearly seen as
punishment since it could also just be the truthful representation of a strong preference. In
CMP, however, once a pair has formed endogenously, one player can punish her partner by
choosing another partner for a limited time.32 Moreover, punishment is a credible threat
in the subgame–perfect equilibrium.
We have seen that the only treatment without exogenous budgets that achieves sub-
stantial levels of honest representation of weak preferences is CMP and we had argued that
this is driven by the possibility to attract more partners or to form endogenous pairs that
31One of these states in the questionnaire, that he considered it unfair to be left out by these two players
and hence started choosing the remaining player, apparently missing the reason why the other two chose
each other.
32One subject stated in the questionnaire, that she followed the strategy to state one–weak–one–strong
and if her partner deviated from this rule, she would switch to another partner for one period. The data
shows that she indeed did.
33achieve higher eﬃciency through truthful representation. An important question is whether
this strategy pays oﬀ. There is some evidence suggesting that it does. If we compare group
by group the average total payoﬀ of the two subjects with the highest Hw to that of the
two subjects with the lowest Hw, we see that the former is higher than the latter in ﬁve
of the seven groups and according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, this diﬀerence is signiﬁ-
cant (z = 1.693,p < 10%).33 Furthermore, we observe three groups where consistently two
players choose each other and are relatively honest (Hw between 42% and 77%). These
three groups are also those with the highest expected eﬃciency and indeed they manage
to reap between 63% and 74% of the eﬃciency gains that would be obtained in the coop-
erative subgame–perfect equilibrium compared to the stage–game Nash equilibrium. This
compares to between 11% and 48% in the other groups. Therefore, building endogenous
pairs paid oﬀ.
6 Conclusion
We have investigated the behavior of experimental subjects in a simple voting game with
private information about the intensity of preferences. We have seen that the exogenously
enforced budgeting mechanism as suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) works
very well in inducing players to represent their preferences truthfully. In his list of “Top
Ten Open Research Questions” Camerer (2003) argues that many mechanisms can be cog-
nitively too demanding to work in practice and that “experiments are an eﬃcient way to
‘test-bed’ mechanisms and craft good theory” (p. 475). One of the aims of our study was to
provide such a test for the Jackson–Sonnenschein mechanism. We found that in addition to
its theoretical attractiveness, it is easily understood by subjects and hence they reap most
33The diﬀerence is also substantial. Taking the overall average across the groups for the two above
measures yields 1939 and 1785, respectively, i.e. on average the two more honest subjects receive a 8.6%
higher payoﬀ than the two less honest subjects. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that across all subjects the spearman
rank-correlation between total payoﬀs and Hw is 0.31 and marginally misses signiﬁcance (p = 0.112). Note,
however, that this test ignores the dependence of observations within groups.
34of the available eﬃciency gains. Alternative mechanisms such as the Clark–Groves mecha-
nism are cognitively much more demanding which makes it substantially more diﬃcult for
experimental subjects to reach the levels of eﬃciency that they theoretically allow for.
In contrast, various forms of social interaction have produced truthful revelation to a
much smaller degree, if at all. Only if the design suggests a linking of a limited number
of problems in a straightforward way or if players can choose their partners, is there an
eﬀect on the honesty rates, which, however, translates into very small eﬃciency gains. That
these eﬃciency gains are substantially smaller than those achieved by an exogenous budget
does not come as a surprise, as the latter allows subjects to link all decisions, while any
conditionally cooperative strategy can only link a subset of decisions. On the one hand,
this shows the strength of the linking mechanism, on the other hand, this makes the latter
a somewhat unfair benchmark for the social interaction treatments.
One might conclude that to arrive at an eﬃcient outcome in such situations with private
information, a central authority that enforces a budget is required. This might, however,
be a premature conclusion. There are further aspects of social interaction that we have not
investigated, but which might be more important outside the laboratory. For example, if
players had an explicit punishment mechanism available, this might enable them to force
each other to stick to a budget. Another important aspect of social interaction that we
did not investigate here is communication, which could help to overcome the coordination
problem. One might argue that given that we did not allow for communication the eﬀect
of competition alone is rather remarkable.
A further reason for the relatively low achieved level of cooperation is most likely that in
the game we have studied, the outcome in the dominant–strategy equilibrium of the stage
game may not be suﬃciently miserable to get the players to try hard enough to overcome
the problem. They have short–term incentives to overstate their preferences and even in
the long run they obtain an acceptable, though ineﬃcient outcome. We might see more
creative approaches by the subjects if overstating of preferences resulted in zero or negative
payoﬀs. In the study by Kaplan and Ruﬄe (2005), for example, the possible eﬃciency
gains are substantially larger. This might be one reason why in their experiments subjects
manage quite well to coordinate on eﬃcient cut–oﬀ strategies.34 While the main result of
34Another reason might be that the (private) signal is ﬁner.
35Kaplan and Ruﬄe does not agree with ours, there is an interesting similarity. We ﬁnd that
it does not help if ex–post information on true preferences is provided. Kaplan and Ruﬄe
also ﬁnd that this does not improve eﬃciency substantially.
To summarize, we observed that private information about preferences makes cooper-
ation diﬃcult, even in repeated interaction settings that enable subjects in many types of
experiments to reap gains from cooperation. We also saw that the fact that information
remains private ex–post does not appear to be the major problem, since changing this
had virtually no eﬀect. Instead, the crucial problems appear to be to coordinate on con-
ditionally cooperative strategies if these can be based only on stochastic information and
that it is relatively diﬃcult for all parties to see the incentives to coordinate. We provide
some evidence that the coordination problem is reduced if subjects decide upon several
problems simultaneously, though this awaits more systematic investigation. Competition
for partners is most eﬀective in reducing these problems and enables endogenously formed
pairs to cooperate. Hence competition has beneﬁts beyond those traditionally identiﬁed in
economics.
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37A Payoﬀs from being honest, tough, and nice


























If both agents always report s or both always report w the decision is always taken by a
ﬂip of a coin and an agent’s payoﬀ would be


















However, deviation from honest behavior is proﬁtable. The agent’s expected payoﬀ from

































clearly higher than the eﬃciency gain from coordination on honest behavior. The expected










































and hence the relative incentive to lie if the other always states a weak preference is
EU(s,w)−EU(h,w)
EU(h,w) = 1
5. The expected payoﬀ from always stating a weak preference if the
other always states a strong preference is obviously zero while if the other states prefer-



















38B Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
In this appendix we provide the proofs of our ﬁve propositions. In order to remind the
reader of the particular equilibria we want to establish, we state the respective proposition
prior to each proof.
Proposition 1 In the inﬁnitely repeated game with ﬁxed matching between two players
(as in FIX), the following constitutes a subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium. Players con-
sider periods in (disjoint) blocks of two and adopt the following trigger strategy: state one
strong and one weak preference (truthfully if possible, randomly otherwise) in a block of
two periods if both players have done so in the past. If one player deviates, always state
strong preferences for 16 periods, then go back to the pattern of one strong and one weak
preference. The ex–ante (i.e. before preferences are drawn) expected payoﬀ per period in
this equilibrium is 13
16. The ex–ante expected honesty rates are Hw = Hs = 3
4.
Proof First, deviating on the punishment path does not pay. If the other player sticks to
the equilibrium strategy and states strong preferences for sixteen periods, there is nothing
to be gained from stating any weak preferences in this part. Next, note that deviating
to stating two weak preferences does obviously not pay and that deviating to stating two
strong preferences pays most if one actually has two strong preferences. Thus we only
need to consider this case. Then stating two strong preferences yields an expected payoﬀ
of 2 + 1
2 · 2 = 3 (since one project will be won for sure and the other will be assigned
randomly). Stating one strong and one weak instead yields an expected payoﬀ of 2. Thus
the gain from deviating in the current block is 1. Now consider the loss in a punishment
block compared to a “normal” block of two periods. If the player has either two strong or
two weak preferences, the expected payoﬀ is not aﬀected, because in expectation he wins
one of the projects, both in a punishment block and in a normal block. Punishment only
aﬀects the expected payoﬀ if the player has one strong and one weak preference (for the
same reason, why linking two decisions increases the eﬃciency only in this case, because it
increases the probability of winning the project with the strong preference). In a normal
block, the expected payoﬀ in this case is (note that the player will state the strong preference
39for the truly strong preference, while the other player will state a strong preference with
probability 1/2 in each case, so the project with the strong preference will be won with
probability 3




















Since the probability to have one strong and one weak preference is 1/2, the diﬀer-









8. Thus if the punishment lasts for eight blocks, a player is indiﬀerent between
deviating or sticking to the equilibrium strategy.35
A player has with probability 1
4 two strong preferences in a block of two periods, with
probability 1
2 one strong and one weak preference and with probability 1
4 two weak prefer-
ences. In the second case, the expected payoﬀ in equilibrium is 7
4 (see above) and similarly
in the ﬁrst it is 2 and in the third it is 1. Hence the total ex-ante expected payoﬀ from a















Thus the ex-ante expected payoﬀ per period is 13
16.
To calculate the ex-ante expected honesty rates, let pw(x) denote the conditional prob-
ability of a weak preference to be in a constellation with x weak preferences (here within
a block of two projects) and hw(x) the probability that a weak preference will be stated
35Obviously, extending the punishment path to more periods results in a strict preference to stick to the
equilibrium strategy, but reduces the eﬃciency gains if punishment ever occurs. We ignore here that in the
inﬁnite game with discounting the expected payoﬀs are inﬁnite anyway. Thus we treat the game from the
perspective of a subject who treats the game as inﬁnite in the sense that he does not consider a deﬁnite
end from which to start backward induction, but is aware of the fact that the game has a ﬁnal end and
thus ﬁnite payoﬀs so that payoﬀ comparisons are meaningful.
40truthfully in such a constellation. Then pw(1) = pw(2) = 1
2, hw(1) = 1 and hw(2) = 1
2.







4. The situation for strong preferences is
symmetric, so Hs = 3
4.

Proposition 2 In the inﬁnitely repeated game with random link formation in a ﬁxed group
of four players (as in RLK), the following constitutes a subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium.
Players consider one period at a time and adopt the following trigger strategy: for one
project, state a strong preference, for two or three projects, state one weak preference and
for four projects, state two weak preferences if all players have followed this pattern in
the past. State preferences as truthfully as possible given these restrictions. If one player
deviates, always state strong preferences for all projects for 19 periods, then go back to
the above pattern. The ex–ante expected payoﬀ per period in this equilibrium is 695
432. The
ex–ante expected honesty rates are Hw = 127
216 ≈ 58.8% and Hs = 61
72 ≈ 84.7%.
Proof First, deviating on the punishment path does not pay. If the other players stick
to the equilibrium strategy and state strong preferences for 19 periods, there is nothing to
be gained from stating any weak preferences in this part.
The fact that the equilibrium strategy requires diﬀerent probabilities of stating a strong
preference conditional on the number of projects might actually suggest that a player should
condition his distribution of weak and strong stated preferences on the number of projects
the respective partners are involved in. Note, however, that independent of the stated
preference of the partner, stating a strong instead of a weak preference always increases the
probability of winning the project by 1/2, so at least for risk–neutral players, the expected
stated preference and hence the number of projects of the partner is irrelevant for how to
optimally allocate the permitted strong stated preferences.
Next, note that deviating to stating more weak preferences than required by the equilib-
rium strategy does obviously not pay and that deviating to stating more strong preferences
than prescribed by the equilibrium strategy pays most if one has four projects and the true
preference for all these projects is strong. Thus we only need to consider this case. For
each project with a strong true preference, stating a strong instead of a weak preference
41increases the probability of winning this project by 1/2. Thus stating four instead of two
strong preferences if a player actually has four strong preferences, increases the expected
payoﬀ by 2 · 1
2 · 2 = 2.
Now consider the loss in a punishment period compared to a “normal” period. To
calculate the expected payoﬀ in a normal period note ﬁrst that the probabilities to have




27, respectively. Straightforward, but tedious
calculation shows that if a player has four projects, the expected payoﬀ given the equilibrium
strategies of the other players in a normal period is En(4) = 41
16. Similarly, for three, two
and one projects En(3) = 119
48 , En(2) = 35
24, En(1) = 17
16. Thus the ex–ante expected payoﬀ



































In a punishment period all players state strong preferences, so any project will be won
with probability 1
2 and so since its expected value is 3
2, each project yields an expected payoﬀ
of 3
4. Furthermore, the expected number of projects is 2, so the ex–ante expected payoﬀ in
a punishment period is 3
2. Thus the expected loss from a punishment period compared to
a normal period is 695
432 − 3
2 = 47
432. Since 19 is the smallest integer t such that 47
432t > 2, not
deviating from the equilibrium strategy pays if the punishment lasts at least 19 periods.
To calculate the ex–ante expected honesty rates, let pw(x|y) denote the conditional prob-
ability of a weak preference to be in a constellation with y projects and x weak preferences
among these and hw(x|y) the probability that a weak preference will be stated truthfully
in such a constellation. Then we obtain pw(1|1) = 4











108,hw(1|4) = 1,pw(2|4) = 1









with ps(x|y) and hs(x|y) deﬁned in a corresponding way, we obtain ps(1|1) = 4
27,hs(1|1) =
1,ps(1|2) = 2
9,hs(1|2) = 1,ps(2|2) = 2
9,hs(2|2) = 1
2,ps(1|3) = 1
12,hs(1|3) = 1,ps(2|3) =
1
6,hs(2|3) = 1,ps(3|3) = 1
12,hs(3|3) = 2
3,ps(1|4) = 1











42Proposition 3 In the ﬁnitely repeated two-stage game where players ﬁrst choose a partner
for the project originating with them and then state preferences for all their projects (as in
CMP), the following constitutes a subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium. Let the number of
periods be n. Players consider one period at a time and adopt the following trigger strategy:
in the ﬁrst stage, two pairs form endogenously, that is two players choose each other and
hence share two projects. In the second stage, both players in each pair state one strong
and one weak preference. Both players continue in this fashion until period n − 2 if they
have done so in the past. In period n − 1, they will state two strong preferences if they
have indeed two strong preferences but again one weak and one strong otherwise. In period
n, if no player stated two strong preferences before, they still choose each other but state
two strong preferences. If player i deviates by stating preferences other than one strong and
one weak in any period, then for the rest of the game, player j (the “partner” of i) chooses
another player, while player i continues to choose j and they both state strong preferences.
If a player is chosen by a player from a diﬀerent pair, he states a strong preference for
the resulting project. The ex–ante expected payoﬀ per period in this equilibrium is 13
8 . The
ex–ante expected honesty rates are Hw = Hs = 3
4.
Proof
We start in the last period, n. Since there is no future, there is no reason to state
a weak preference, so no player will deviate in the second stage of period n. Since all
players will state strong preferences, it is irrelevant which partner is chosen, so there is no
strict incentive to deviate from the equilibrium partner choice in the ﬁrst stage of period
n. Now consider period n − 1. Obviously, the only plausible deviation is to state two
strong preferences. This increases the probability to win the second project by 1
2, so the
expected gain is 1 if the player actually has two strong preferences and 1
2 if he has at most
one strong preference (since he would in equilibrium state a strong preference for his true
strong preference if he has one). If he states two strong preferences, he loses a project in
43period n.36 The expected payoﬀ from this project is (since both players will state a strong





4. Hence it pays to state two strong
preferences in period n−1 if and only if a player has two strong preferences. Now consider
period n − 2. Again, the gain from stating two strong preferences if the true preferences
are indeed strong is 1. As a consequence, the player would have only one project (unless he
is chosen by a player from the other pair, but that happens independent of the behavior of
himself or his partner, so can be ignored) in periods n − 1 and n, with strong preferences
stated by both players and hence expected payoﬀs of 3
4 in both periods. Thus the payoﬀ




This has to be compared with the expected payoﬀ from periods n − 1 and n if he does not
deviate in n − 2. We have to take into account that both i and j would state two strong
preferences (which they have with probability 1
4) truthfully in n − 1. If i has two strong
preferences in n−1, his expected payoﬀ is (the ﬁrst 3
4 being the expected payoﬀ from period































If i has two weak preferences in n−1, his expected payoﬀ is (the ﬁrst 3
2 being the expected































Finally, if i has one strong and one weak preference in n − 1, his expected payoﬀ from




















































Thus it does not pay to deviate from stating one strong and one weak preference in period
n − 2 even if the true preferences are both strong. If the horizon is longer, the total losses
36Note that if j deviates in n−1, he will still choose i in n (unless i deviates as well), so when considering
whether to deviate, i does not have to take into account the probability that j deviates.
44from losing the partner in the remaining periods is obviously even higher, so it does not
pay to deviate in any of the previous periods.
Finally note that since each player has two projects in each period of this equilibrium
and that these two projects are linked and budgeted as in a block of two projects in the
above equilibrium of FIX, the ex–ante expected payoﬀ in each period is equal to the ex–ante
expected payoﬀ in a block of two periods in that equilibrium and hence equal to 13
8 and the
ex-ante expected honesty rates are Hw = Hs = 3
4.

Proposition 4 In the inﬁnitely repeated game with ﬁxed matching between two players
and ex–post information about the intensity of preferences (as in FXI), the following con-
stitutes a subgame–perfect Nash equilibrium. Players state their preferences truthfully if
both players have done so in the past. If it becomes known at the end of a period that a
player misrepresented his preference, both players state always strong preferences for four
periods and then go back to honest representation. The ex–ante expected payoﬀ per period
in this equilibrium is 7
8, and the ex–ante expected honesty rates are Hw = Hs = 1.
Proof
Obviously, there is no incentive to deviate in a punishment period and the only deviation
to consider in a normal period is to state a strong preference when the true preference is
weak. Since this raises the probability of winning by 1
2, the expected gain from the deviation
is 1
2. The ex–ante expected payoﬀ in a normal period is 7
8, while that in a punishment
period is 3
4. Thus deviating does not pay if the punishment lasts for at least four periods.
The expected honesty rates follow immediately from the fact that preferences are stated
truthfully in equilibrium.

Proposition 5 In the inﬁnitely repeated game with ﬁxed matching between two players
and four projects in each period (as in F4P), the following constitutes a subgame–perfect
Nash equilibrium. Players play the following trigger strategy: state two strong and two
weak strategies (as truthfully as possible, randomly otherwise) in each period if both players
45have done so in the past. If one player deviates, always state strong preferences for seven
periods, then go back to the pattern of two strong and two weak preferences. The ex–ante
expected payoﬀ per period in this equilibrium is 53
16. The ex–ante expected honesty rates are
Hw = Hs = 13
16.
Proof
Obviously, deviating in a punishment period does not pay and deviating in a normal
period pays most when the true preferences are all strong and a player would deviate to
state only strong preferences. Thus we only need to consider this case. By deviating from
stating a weak to stating a strong preference, the probability of winning this project is
increased by 1
2 and hence the expected gain from this deviation is 2.
The expected payoﬀ from each project in a punishment period is the stage–game Nash–
equilibrium payoﬀ of 3
4, so the total ex–ante expected payoﬀ in a punishment period is 3.
To calculate the ex–ante expected payoﬀ in a normal period, note that with probability 1
16




16 he has three,





























Thus a punishment period leads to a loss in expected payoﬀ of 5
16 and hence if the
punishment lasts for at least seven periods, deviating from the equilibrium path does not
pay.
With pw(x) and hw(x) as above we obtain pw(1) = pw(4) = 1
8, pw(2) = pw(3) = 3
8,
hw(1) = hw(2) = 1, hw(3) = 2
3, hw(4) = 1












For strong preferences the situation is symmetric, so Hs = 13
16.
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You are taking part in an experiment on decision-making. If you read the following instructions care-
fully, you can - depending on the decisions you and other participants of this experiment will make - 
influence your own earnings as well as the earnings of the other participants. It is, therefore, important 
that you pay attention to the instructions given below. These instructions are the same for all partici-
pants. 
 
The instructions distributed are intended for your personal information only. Please do not talk to any of 
the other participants for the duration of the experiment. Please address questions you might have to us 
directly. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you will face the same situation that is described 
below. During this experiment we will calculate your earnings directly in Pence. Your income from each 
period, as well as your cumulative earnings, will, therefore, be stated in Pence. At the end of the ex-
periment we will pay you your earnings in cash, at the known rate of 1£=100 Pence. 
 
This experiment will last for 40 periods.  
 
Whom you interact with 
 
Throughout the experiment you form a group of four with the same three other participants of the ex-
periment. You will be able to identify previous choices of the others since each group member (includ-
ing you) is assigned a “name” (A-D) and will keep this “name” throughout the experiment. After the 
experiment, however, you will not be able to infer which participants you were actually interacting with 
as the “names” and group composition will not be revealed. 
 
Each of the 40 periods is divided into two stages. 
 
In the first stage, each person in your group chooses a link to one other group member. Each two 
group members that are linked in this way will be involved in a joint project. This means that in each 
period you will be involved in one to four projects, depending on how many links you have gotten in 
that period. You will be involved in at least one project (since you choose one link to another person) 
and in at most four projects (if all the other three members of your group choose you). In each new 
period, the links are chosen anew.  
 
In the second stage, each two participants involved in a joint project will have to make a joint decision. 
Thus, you are involved in one to four independent decisions. Your payment and the payment of the 
other participant involved in a particular project will depend on the decision that is taken according to 
the rules described below on the basis of your actions. 
 
If you are involved in more than one project, it is important to note that - within each period - the deci-
sions are completely independent across projects. This means that in each period your actions taken 
with respect to one project will have no effect whatsoever on the payments you get from another pro-
ject. In particular, you can be involved in two decisions with one other participant in one period, namely   2 
if you choose her or him and he or she chooses you. Even in this case, these two projects are inde-
pendent, that is, the actions taken concerning one project do not influence the payments from the other.  
 
What are you paid? 
 
Each project can be executed in two different versions. The two participants involved in a project al-
ways disagree on the version of the project that should be executed and this is always known to both of 
them. 
 
For each project you are involved in, you will get a positive payment if your preferred version is cho-
sen. If the other’s preferred version is chosen, you will get nothing. 
 
Each project can be more or less important to you. We will call the importance the project has for you 
its priority. Hence for each single project, the priority that the project has for you can either be high 
(in which case you would get 60 Pence if your preferred version is chosen), or low (in which case you 
would get 30 Pence if your preferred version is chosen). Both, a low and a high priority, are equally 
likely. For each project you are involved in, these priorities are independently drawn. This means that 
whether your priority for one project is high or low does not influence the probability that it is high for 
another project you are involved in, either in the current or any future period. 
 
For each project, you learn the priority you assign to the project before you are required to make a 
decision. The other participant will not be informed about your priority. He or she only knows that it 
can be high or low, and that both are equally likely.  
 
Similarly, you do not know the priority the other participant assigns to the project. All you know is also 
that it can be high or low, and that both are equally likely. The draws for both of you are independent. 
This means no matter whether your priority is high or low, it is always equally likely that the other 
player’s priority will be high or low.  
 
Thus, for each project, the two of you involved in the decision do not know for whom it is more valu-
able if his or her preferred version of the project becomes accepted, or whether both of you value it 
equally. Note that for each project only one participant involved can get a positive payment. Who that 
is depends on the version of the project that is chosen. 
 
How is the decision taken? 
 
In each period, after the decisions in the first stage have been made, you are informed about all the links 
in your group. Hence you will know how many projects you are involved in and also the “name” of the 
respective other participant in each project. For each project you are involved in, you will then observe 
the priority you assign to that project. The priority can be different for different projects you are in-
volved in. 
 
For each project, after you have observed the priority you assign to the project, you and the other par-
ticipant involved in that project decide on the version that should be chosen.  
 
Both of you will be asked to state a priority for the project. This stated priority does not have to be the 
same as your true priority.  
   3 
For each project, the version, for which the higher priority is stated will be chosen. That is, if either you 
or the other participant states a high priority and the other a low priority, the preferred version of the 
person who stated the high priority will be chosen. If, however, both of you state the same priority, the 
decision will be taken randomly whereby both versions will equally likely be chosen. This is illustrated in 
the following table. 
 
The other participant states a 
 
High priority  Low Priority 
High priority 
Random decision, each 
version with probability 
50% 
Your preferred version 
is chosen 
You state a 
Low priority 
The other participant’s 
preferred version is 
chosen 
Random decision, each 




If your preferred version of the project is chosen, you will get 60p or 30p, depending on your true pri-
ority and the other participant will receive nothing. If the other participant’s preferred version is chosen, 
he or she will receive 60p or 30p, depending on his or her true priority and you will receive nothing. 
Your possible payments are illustrated in the following table 
 
 
The chosen version is 
 
Your preferred  The other’s preferred 
High  You get 60p  You get 0p 
Your priority is 




Consider the following example: assume you are participant A. You choose a link to C. B chooses D, 
C chooses you and D also chooses you. Hence you are involved in three projects, one with D and 
two with C (because the link going from you to C and the one going from C to you correspond to two 
independent projects). B is involved in only one project (with D), C is involved in two projects (both 




Now assume that for the first project with C you have a high priority and for the second project with C 
you have a low priority. For the project with D you also have a low priority. Assume that for the first 
project with C you state a high priority and C states a low priority. Hence your preferred version of this 
A 
D  C 
B   4 
project is implemented and you receive 60p. Furthermore, assume that for the second project with C 
you state a low priority and C states a high priority. Hence the version that C prefers will be chosen, so 
you receive nothing for the second project. For the project with D assume that you both state a high 
priority and that the randomly chosen version is the one you prefer. Hence (since your real priority was 
low), you receive 30p. Thus in this period you receive 90p in total. 
 
Information you receive 
 
At the end of each period, you will be presented three screens that contain information about the cur-
rent and previous periods.  
 
The first screen will contain all information that is relevant for your earnings in the current period. For 
each of the projects you are involved in, you will be able to observe the stated priority of the other par-
ticipant, your stated priority, and the decision that has been taken. You will also be informed about 
your payment from each project, your total payment from the current period and your cumulative earn-
ings up to that period. 
 
The second screen shows for all four projects in your group the priorities stated by both participants.  
 
On a third screen, you will get a summary of what happend up to the current period. This screen con-
tains the stated priorities by all members in your group of four (A, B, C, and D) in all preceding peri-
ods. For each participant, it will simply list the stated priorities, but not indicate who was involved in a 





-  The experiment will last for 40 periods. 
-  Throughout those 40 periods you will form a group of four with the same three other partici-
pants. 
-  In the first stage of each period, each group member chooses a link to one other group mem-
ber. 
-  In the second stage, each two group members that are linked engage in a joint project. 
-  In each period, you may be involved in one to four projects. 
-  In each period, actions you take with respect to one project have no payoff consequences on 
any other project in this period. 
-  For each project, you and the other person disagree on the version of the project that should 
be chosen. 
-  For each  project you are involved in, you observe your priority of the project, but not the 
other’s. 
-  For each project, you and the other participant are both asked to state a priority of the project. 
This does not have to be equal to your true priority. 
-  For each project, the version for which the higher priority is stated is chosen. 
-  If both players state equal priorities, the version will be chosen randomly. 
-  For each project you are involved in, you will be paid according to your true priority if your 
preferred version is chosen, otherwise you will receive nothing. 
-  At the end of each period you receive all information that is payoff relevant for you and infor-









Please answer the following questions before we start the experiment 
 




2.  Assume you are person B. Let the links in your group be as follows: A chooses D, B chooses 
A, C chooses A, D chooses B. How many projects are you involved in? How many projects 




3.  Assume that for one project both you and the other participant state a low priority. Whose pre-




4.  Assume that for one project your priority is low and the other participant’s priority is high. If 
you state a low priority and the other participant a high priority, what are the payments for you 




5.  Assume that for one project your priority is low and the other participant’s priority is high. If 
you state a high priority and the other participant a low priority, what are the payments for you 




6.  Assume that for one project your priority is high and the other participant’s priority is low. If 
you both state a high priority and the random procedure picks the other participant’s preferred 




7.  Assume that in the current period you are involved in 3 projects. For the first project, your pri-
ority is high and your preferred version is chosen. For the second project, your priority is high 
and the other’s preferred version is chosen. For the third project, your priority is low and your 
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